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In most democracies, the majority of education expenditures is ﬁnanced by
the government. In non-democracies, we observe a wide variation in the mix
of public and private funding of education. In addition, countries with high in-
equality tend to rely more heavily on private schooling. We develop a theory
which integrates private decisions on education and fertility with voting on pub-
lic schooling expenditures. The theory is able to account for the facts mentioned
above. Countries with high inequality exhibit more private education expendi-
tures since rich people opt out of the public system. In non-democracies, con-
centration of political power leads to multiple equilibria in the determination of
public education spending.
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Public schooling is one of the most widespread social policies around the world to-
day. Starting with industrializing European nations in the nineteenth century, nearly
all countries have introduced compulsory schooling laws and public funding of edu-
cation. However, despite the near universal involvement of the government, private
and public funding of education continue to coexist. The share of private educa-
tion funding varies greatly across countries, from only 1.9 percent of total spending
in Norway, to 44.5 percent in Chile (1998, see Appendix A.1). Institutional arrange-
ments concerning the funding of private schools also differ across countries. Private
schools can be partly supported by the government as in France or New Zealand, or
even entirely publicly funded as in Belgium, or rely exclusively on private funding as
in the United States (Toma 1996).
The coexistence of public and private providers in some countries raises the question
why societies make different choices about the mix of public and private funding of
education. To address this question, we develop a heterogeneous agents model in
which education is a private good, but people can vote to provide free public educa-
tion which is ﬁnanced through income taxes. Adults decide whether their children
participate in public schooling. Parents who provide private education choose how
much education to provide; in contrast, all children in the public system receive the
same quality of education.
The decision of aparentbetween publicand private education dependson the quality
of tax-ﬁnanced public schooling. In the model, the private option is chosen by people
whose preferred quality of education far exceeds what is provided for free by the
government. Public education spending, in turn, is determined through a vote of the
adult population. The speciﬁc political mechanism that we employ is probabilistic
voting. Relative to majority voting, the probabilistic model has the advantage that
outcomes depend smoothly on every voter’s preferences. In other words, results do
not depend solely on the preferences of the median voter.
Since both the level of public funding and the decision whether to provide schooling
privately are endogenous, we can analyze how the education-ﬁnance mix and the
quality of education depend on the characteristics of an economy. In particular, we
focus on two main determinants of political outcomes in a country, the distribution
1of income and the distribution of political power.
We ﬁnd that when political power is evenly distributed, such as in a representative
democracy, a unique political equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium it is never op-
timal to provide zero public schooling. The extent of public versus private funding
depends on the income distribution. In a society with little inequality, all parents use
public schooling. For increasing levels of inequality, ﬁrst rich and ultimately some
poor people choose private education for their children.1 This result provides a con-
trast to the literature where a greater degree of inequality motivates more redistribu-
tion through the political process (see Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini
1994, and in particular Gradstein and Justman 1997 in an application to education).
In our model the increased need for redistribution is offset by richer people who opt
out of the public system and vote for less public schooling.
If the political system is biased towards low-income households, the results are qual-
itatively the same as in the case of an even distribution of political power. Since the
public education system is redistributive, an electorate dominated by poorer people
chooses higher levels of public education, but the link between inequality and the
extent of public schooling remains intact.
If political power is concentrated among the rich, as in many dictatorships, there is
no longer a guarantee that the voting outcome is unique. It is possible that a given
population chooses either a high quality of public education with everyone partici-
pating in the public system, or a low quality of public education with the rich sending
their children to private schools. The source of multiplicity is a complementarity be-
tween the rich voters’ choice of whether to participate in public education, and their
preferred quality of public schools.
An important feature of our model is that we allow for endogenous fertility. It has
long beenknown thatin the data fertility andeducation decisionsare interdependent.
By explicitly incorporating fertility choices, the model is able to generate realistic pre-
dictions for the relationship between the education regime and fertility differentials
within the population. Endogenous fertility also turns out to be important from a
theoretical perspective. In particular, a family’s total expenditures on children are
independent of the schooling choice, because fertility is lower in households opting
1This echoes the result of Besley and Coate (1991). Assuming that quality is a normal good, house-
holds who opt out of the public sector are those with higher incomes.
2for private schools. This feature has consequences for the relation between the extent
and the quality of public schooling, and helps to guarantee uniqueness of political
outcomes in democracies.
The main predictions of our theory are consistent with evidence on the level of public
and private schooling across countries. As described in Appendix A.1, inequality in
the 1970s is a strong predictor of the share of private education funding in the 1990s.
The correlation between the Gini coefﬁcient in 1970and the share of private education
funding at the primary and secondary levels in 1998 is 0.55. We also ﬁnd that fertility
differentials between high and low educated mothers are higher in countries that
rely more on private funds. Appendix A.2 documents that the relationship between
inequality and private funding is also present across U.S. States.
Concerning the role of political power, we turn to the relationship between democ-
racy and education funding. If we interpret democracies as countries with an even
distribution of political power, while non-democracies are biased to the rich, our
model implies that there is more scope for variation in education systems in non-
democracies than in democracies. Indeed, using a cross section of 158 countries, we
ﬁnd that the variance of public spending across countries is smaller for democracies
than for non-democracies (see Appendix A.3).
Consider, for example, the contrast of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Both are oil-rich countries which are similar in may respects, including low scores
on the democracy index. One might expect that their education systems would be
similar as well. In reality, however, Sau d iA r a b i as p e n d s6 . 1 5p e r c e n to fG D Po n
public education, while the Emirates only spend 1.87 percent (1990-95 average). Our
interpretation is that, in principle, a high-quality public schooling system could be
supported in the Emirates aswell. Given thelow political powerof the poor however,
the quality of public education is so low that rich people prefer private schooling
for their children. The rich therefore do not take an interest in the quality of public
schooling, which perpetuates the existing regime of low public spending.
Our paper relates to an existing literature on the choice of public versus private
schooling which relies on majority voting as the political mechanism (see Stiglitz
1974, Glomm and Ravikumar 1998, Epple and Romano 1996b, and Glomm and Pat-
terson 2002). A recurring theme in this literature is the argument that if private al-
ternatives to public schools exist, voters’ preferences may fail to be single-peaked. In
3particular, very poor households, who are less willing than middle-income house-
holds to forgo consumption in lieu of better public schooling, will form a coalition
with very rich households, who choose private schooling. A majority-voting equilib-
rium may still exist in this case, but expenditures are lower than what is preferred by
the voter with median income. In our probabilistic voting model, equilibria are al-
ways guaranteed to exist. Moreover, the probabilistic voting setup is not restricted to
democracies, since we can analyze what happens if all voting power is concentrated
on the rich.
Our model makes predictions for the link between inequality in a country and the
resulting education system and quality of education. A similar objective is followed
by Fern´ andez andRogerson (1995), who considera model where education isdiscrete
(zero or one), partially subsidized by the government, and voters decide on the extent
of the subsidy. Fernandez and Rogerson emphasize that inunequal societies, the very
poor may forgo education alltogether. Since all voters are taxed, in this case public
education constitutes a transfer of resources from the very poor and the very rich to
the middle class, echoing the ﬁndings of Epple and Romano (1996a).
A different branch of the literature takes the schooling regime (public or private) as
given, and analyzes the economic implications of each regime. Glomm and Raviku-
mar (1992) contrast the effects of public and private schooling systems on growth
and inequality. In a country with little inequality, a ﬁscal externality created by public
schooling leadstolowergrowth underpublicschooling thanunderprivateschooling.
In unequal societies, however, public schooling can dominate, since more resources
are directed to poor individuals with a high return on education. Similar conclusions
are derived by de la Croix and Doepke (2004) in a framework which emphasizes the
interdependence of fertility and education decisions of parents. The model of Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992) has been extended by B´ enabou (1996) to allow for local inter-
actions between agents, such as neighborhood effects and knowledge spillovers.
In the next section, we introduce our model and analyze the political equilibrium.
Section 3 describes how in a democratic country the choice of a schooling regime and
the quality of schooling depend on the income distribution. Section 4 generalizes the
voting process to allow for unequal political power. We show that multiple equilibria
can arise in societies dominated by the rich. In Section 5, we extend the model to
a dynamic framework and analyze the feedback from education choices to income
4and population dynamics. Section 6 concludes. The appendix summarizes empirical
evidence and contains all proofs.
2 The Model Economy
Preferences and technology
The model economy is populated by people who care about consumption c,t h e i r
number of children n, and their children’s education h. We start with a static econ-
omy; in Section 5, we extend the analysis to an overlapping generations economy
where today’s children are tomorrow’s adults. There are two types of people, skilled
and unskilled. While our results generalize to an arbitrary number (or even a con-
tinuum) of skill levels, concentrating on two types will simplify the exposition. The







Notice that parents care both about child quantity ni and quality hi.T h ep a r a m e t e r
γ ∈ R+ is the overall weight attached to children. The parameter η ∈ (0,1) is the
relative weight of quality.3 As we will see below, the tradeoff between quantity and
quality is affected by the human capital endowment of the parent and by the school-
ing regime.
To attain human capital, children have to be educated by teachers. The wage of teach-
ers equals the average wage in the population ¯ w. Parents can choose from two dif-
ferent modes of education. First, there is a public schooling system, which provides
au n i f o r me d u c a t i o ns to every student. Education in the public system is ﬁnanced
through an income tax v; apart from the tax, there are no direct costs to the parents.
2Any utility function representinghomothetic preferencesdeﬁned over the bundle (ci,ni,hi) would
lead to the same results.
3The parameter η cannot exceed 1 because the parents’ optimization problem would not have a
solution. More speciﬁcally, utility goes to inﬁnity as parents choose arbitrarily high levels of education
and arbitrarily low levels of fertility. In Section 5 we provide a different interpretation of the model,
where the condition η < 1 implies decreasing returns to education. A similar condition can be found
in Moav (2001).
5The schooling quality s and the tax rate v are determined through voting, to be de-
scribed in more detail later. Parents also have the possibility of opting out of the
public system. In this case, parents can freely choose the education quality ei,b u t
they have to pay the teacher out of their own income. Since education ei is measured
in units of time of the average teacher, the total cost of educating ni children privately
is given by niei ¯ w. We assume that education spending is tax deductible. While tax
deductibility ofeducation expendituresvaries across countries, full deductibility sim-
pliﬁes the analysis because it implies that taxation does not distort the choice between
quantity and quality of children. Apart from the education expenditure, raising one
child also takes fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of an adult’s time. The budget constraint for an
adult with wage wi is then given by:
ci =( 1 − v)
 
wi(1 − φni) − niei ¯ w
 
.( 2 )
Education is thus either private, ei, or public, s. Effective education can be expressed
as the maximum of the two: hi = max{ei,s}. Of course, parents who prefer public
education will choose ei = 0.
The consumption good is produced by competitive ﬁrms using labor as the only in-
put. We assume that the aggregate production function is linear in both labor inputs.
The production setup does not play an important role in our analysis; the advantage
of the linear production function is that wages are constant. Using A for unskilled
and B for skilled, we have:
Yt = wALA + wBLB.
Here wA and wB > wA are the marginal product of each type. We can normalize
wA = 1 without loss of generality. The total input of the groups are given by LA and
LB. The input of workers of type i is smaller than the total population Pi, since some
adults work as teachers.
It is convenient to deﬁne the relative wage of a family of type i as xi = wi/ ¯ w.S u b s t i -
tuting the budget constraint (2) into the utility function (1) allows rewriting the utility
of household i as:
ui[v,ni,ei,s]=ln(1 − v)+ln(xi(1 − φni) − niei)+γlnni + γηlnmax{ei,s}.
6Relative wages are related to the size of the two groups. Denoting the sizes of the
groups relative to group A by:
ξA = 1, ξB =
PB
PA,( 3 )





1 + ξB ,( 4 )
which allows us to compute:
xB =
wB(1 + ξB)
1 + ξBwB ∈ [1,wB].( 5 )
We see from this equation that the wage of skilled people relative to the average, xB,
varies from wB to 1 when ξB varies from 0 to inﬁnity. Equation (4) also implies the
following relation between xB, xA and ξA:
xA = 1 + ξB(1 − xB) ∈ [1/wB,1].( 6 )
Timing of events and private choices
The level of public funding for education (s and v) is chosen by probabilistic voting
among the adult population. The voters’ preferences depend on their optimal fer-
tility and education choices (n, e and ψ), which are made before voting takes place.
In making these choices, agents have perfect foresight regarding the outcome of the
voting process. This timing is motivated by the observation that public education
spending can be adjusted frequently, while fertility cannot, and the choice between
public versus private education entails switching costs that are non negligible.
At given expected policy variables v and s, the utility function ui is concave in ni.
Within each group, some agents may choose public schooling, in which case their
fertility rate is denoted ˆ ni, while others opt for private education; fertility for those in
private schools is denoted as ˜ ni. Both the skilled and unskilled parents planning to
7send their children to the public school choose the same fertility level:




≡ ˆ n.( 7 )
The households planning to provide private schooling chose:











Private spending on education depends positively on relative wage xi.N o t i c et h a tei
is independent from the outcome of the voting process, implying that the timing of





≡ ˜ n < ˆ n (9)
From equations (7) and (9) we see that parents choosing private education have a
lower fertility rate. This result has a testable implication. In countries where public
education is dominant, fertility differentials between high- and low-skilled mothers
should be smaller than in countries with a large share of private education, which is
what we ﬁnd in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1 (Constant parental spending on children)
For given s, v and wi, parental spending on children (and therefore taxable income) does not
depend on the choice of private versus public schooling and is equal to
γ
1+γ wi.
Lemma 1 implies that the tax base does not depend on the fraction of people partici-
pating in publicschooling. Thisproperty will beimportant forgenerating uniqueness
of equilibrium. The lemma relies on three assumptions: homothetic preferences, tax
deductible education spending, and endogenous fertility. With endogenous fertility,
parents choosing private schools have fewer children, keeping their total budget allo-
cation to children in line with those choosing public schools.4 This is a typical feature
of endogenous fertility models.
4With ﬁxed fertility, the resources allocated to children would be wiφn with public education and
wiφn/(1 − η) with private education.
8The political mechanism
We denote the endogenous percentage of children of each group participating in the








xi(1 − φψi ˆ ni − φ(1 − ψi)˜ ni) − (1 − ψi)˜ niei
 
¯ w, (10)
with total spending on public education on the left-hand side and total revenues on
the right-hand side. Since the level of schooling and taxes are linked through the
budget constraint, the policy choice is one-dimensional.
The level of public expenditures, and hence taxes, is chosen through probabilistic
voting. Assume that there are two political parties, p and q. Each one proposes a
policy: sp, sq. The gain (or loss) of voter i if party q wins the election instead of p is
ui[vq,ni,ei,sq]−ui[vp,ni,ei,sp]. Instead of assuming that voter i votes for q every time
this difference is positive as in the median voter model, probabilistic voting theory
supposes that this vote is uncertain. More precisely, the probability that voter i votes






where Fi is a differentiable cumulative distribution function. This function captures
the idea that voters care about an “ideology” variable in addition to the speciﬁc pol-
icy measure at hand, i.e., the quality of public schooling. The presence of a concern
for ideology, which is independent of the policy measure, makes the political choice
less predictable (see Persson and Tabellini (2000) for different formalizations of this
approach).
Since the share of each type voting for a given party varies continuously with the pro-
posed policy platform, probabilistic voting leads to smooth aggregation of all voters’
preferences, instead of dependingsolely on the preferencesof the medianvoter. Party
q maximizes its expected vote share, which is given by ∑i ξiFi(·).P a r t yp acts sym-
metrically, and, in equilibrium, we have s = sq = sp. The maximization program of




ξi (Fi) (0) ui[v,ni,ei,s]=0.
The weights (Fi) (0) capture the responsiveness of voters to the change in utility. In
particular, agroup thathas little ideological bias cares relativelymore abouteconomic
policy. Such groups are therefore targeted by politicians and enjoy high political
power. In addition, political power may also depend on other features of the political
system such as voting rights. We will capture the political power of each group by a
single parameter θi. Thisincludesthe extreme casesofrepresentative democracywith
equal responsiveness (θA = θB), and dictatorship of the rich (θA = 0). Accordingly,





ψiui[v, ˆ n,0,s]+( 1 − ψi)ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0]
 
. (11)
The maximization is subject to the government budget constraint (10).
We start by assuming that all individuals have the same political power, i.e. θA =
θB = 1, implying that the weight of each group in the objective function is simply
given by its population share. The role of this assumption will be further investigated
in Section 4. It can be checked that Ω[s] is strictly concave. Taking the ﬁrst-order
condition for a maximum and solving for s yields:
s =
ηφ(1 + ξB)
1 + ξB + γη(ψA + ξBψB)
≡ s[ψA,ψB]. (12)
From this expression we can see that s is decreasing in both participation rates ψA
and ψB. This reﬂects a congestion effect: when more children participate in public
schools, spending per child is reduced. Looking at the corresponding tax rate,
v =
ηγ(ψA + ξBψB)
1 + ξB + γη(ψA + ξBψB)
, (13)
we observe that a rise in participation is followed by a less than proportional rise in
taxation. Since, by Lemma 1, the taxable income is unaffected by increased participa-
5This result was ﬁrst derived by Coughlin and Nitzan (1981). The same framework can also be
derived within the setup of lobbying models, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
10tion, this translates into lower spending per child.
The equilibrium
So far, we have taken the fractions ψA and ψB of agents participating in public ed-
ucation as given, and solved for the corresponding voting outcome concerning the
quality of public schools. In equilibrium, the choice whether or not to participate
in public schooling has to be optimal. This leads to the following deﬁnition of an
equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium)
An equilibrium is a vector of individual variables (ˆ ni, ˜ ni,ei,ψi)i=A,B and aggregate variables
(s,v) such that equations (7)-(13) hold, and the following conditions are satisﬁed:
∀i, if

    
    
ψi = 1: ui[v, ˆ n,0,s] ≥ ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0]
1 > ψi > 0:ui[v, ˆ n,0,s]=ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0]
ψi = 0: ui[v, ˆ n,0,s] ≤ ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0].
(14)
The ﬁrst constraint says that if public education yields higher utility for group i,e v -
eryone in group i uses the public education system. The second constraint says that
for group i to split between the two types of schools they need to be indifferent be-
tween them. The third constraint applies when group i prefers private education.
A ﬁrst result is that parents with high human capital are more demanding in terms of
public education quality, or, in other words, quality is a normal good:
Lemma 2 (Opting out decision)
There exist sA and sB, satisfying 0 < sA < sB, such that type i opts out of public education if
and only if s < si.
An implication of the above lemma is that if some skilled people choose the public
regime, all unskilled love it. Similarly, if at least some unskilled people choose private
education, all skilled household choose it as well.
11Lemma 3 (Coverage of public education)
Denote the coverage of public education as Ψ = ψA + ψB ∈ [0,2]. ψA and ψB satisfy the
following relationships
(ψB > 0) ⇒ (ψA = 1)
(ψA < 1) ⇒ (ψB = 0),
and are therefore uniquely determined by Ψ.
An implication of the Lemma is that potential equilibria can be indexed by Ψ.W ec a n
now deﬁne the function:
∆i[Ψ]=ui[v, ˆ n,0,s] − ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0]
which expresses the difference of utilities between public and private education for
group i as a function of Ψ,w h e r es and v depend on Ψ. ∆i[Ψ] is not well deﬁned at
Ψ = 0, since here measure zero of agents use public schooling, so that positive public




Extended this way, the function ∆i[Ψ] is continuous. We can now deﬁne a mapping F
from (∆A,∆B) to the interval [0,2], which gives the set of values for Ψ consistent with
∆A and ∆B in equilibrium:
F(∆A,∆B)=

           
           
2f o r ∆A > 0,∆B > 0
[1,2] for ∆A > 0,∆B = 0
1f o r ∆A > 0,∆B < 0
[0,1] for ∆A = 0,∆B < 0
0f o r ∆A < 0,∆B < 0.
The combined mapping F(∆A,∆B) maps the interval [0,2] into itself, and equilibria
are given byﬁxed points of thismapping. Wecan now examineexistence andunique-
12ness of equilibria.
Proposition 1 (Existence of equilibria)
An equilibrium exists.
The following corollary shows that the private regime is never an equilibrium.
Corollary 1 (Equilibrium coverage of public education)
In equilibrium we always have Ψ > 0.
Both differences ui[v, ˆ n,0,s]−ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0] are monotonically decreasingin ψA and ψB,
because v drops out and s depends negatively on ψA and ψB through the congestion
effect. Consequently, the functions ∆A and ∆B are monotonically decreasing in Ψ.
This will ensure uniqueness of equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness of the equilibrium)
The equilibrium is unique.
The uniqueness result relies on the assumption that fertility is endogenous. If one
assumes to the contrary that fertility is exogenous and constant, Lemma 1 no longer
holds and the tax basis increases with the ψi. Computing the total effect of the ψi
on s, s still decreases with ψA but now increases with ψB: for skilled parents the tax
basis effect dominates the congestion effect. Consequently, uniqueness is no longer
guaranteed. This result underlines the importance of accounting for the interaction
of fertility and education decisions.
3 Comparing the Education Regimes
We showed in Corollary 1 that there are always some parents who choose public edu-
cation for their children. Depending on the coverage of the public education system,
this leaves four cases to be considered.
13Regime Ψ ψA ψB
Public 2 1 1
Partial segregation (1) ∈ (1,2) 1 ∈ (0,1)
Segregation 1 1 0
Partial segregation (2) ∈ (0,1) ∈ (0,1) 0
In the public regime, all children go to public school. Under segregation, all skilled
parents send their children to private school, while unskilled use public schools. In
the two partial segregation regimes, either the skilled (1) or the unskilled (2) par-
ents are indifferent between public and private schools. We now characterize these
regimes in more detail, with a special focus on the quality of public education s.W e
also examine under which conditions each regime arises in equilibrium.
We have seen in equation (12) that quality of public education depends negatively
on participation rates, due to a congestion effect. As a consequence, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Quality of public education)




in the public regime, (15)
s =
ηφ(1 + ξB)
1 + ξB + γη
in the segregated regime. (16)
Quality in public schools is higher in the segregation regime than in the public regime. In the
segregation regime, the quality of education decreases with the mass of unskilled people in the
economy.
In the public regime, the quality of education s depends neither on the relative in-
comes xi nor on the weight of each group ξi. In the segregation regime, the quality
of public schooling increases in the relative number ξB of skilled people in the pop-
ulation, since the tax base is wider if there are more skilled people. This can have
14dynamic consequences: if the number of unskilled people tends to increase over time
in a given country, our model predicts that the quality of public education will fall.
The model also has interesting implications in the partial segregation regimes. In
these cases, one group of people is indifferent between both types of schools. This
implies that the quality they receive from public schools is lower than the one from
private schools, since the gap between the two has to compensate for higher costs
of private education. This result is consistent with the literature devoted to the esti-
mation of the relative quality of private education, correcting for the effect of higher
social class of the pupils in the private sector. The majority of the results suggest
that controlling for sample selectivity reduces the achievement advantage of private
school students over public school students, but does not eliminate it.6
We now turn to the question under which condition each education regime arises.
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4 (Occurrence of education regimes)
Whether public schooling can arise in equilibriumdepends on the preference parameters γ and
η.L e tδ =( 1 − η)
1− 1
η and ˆ γ = δ/η.
If γ > ˆ γ, public education is not an equilibrium outcome. Segregation arises if the conditions
xB >
δ(1 + ξB)









1 + ξB + γη
 
(18)
are satisﬁed. Partial segregation (1) (skilled are indifferent) arises if (17) is violated, and
partial segregation (2) (unskilled are indifferent) arises if (18) is violated.






6See Kingdon (1996) for India, Bedi and Garg (2000) for Indonesia, Alderman, Orazem, and Pa-
terno (2001) for Pakistan, Vandenberghe and Robin (2003) for Brazil and Neal (1997) for Catholic U.S.
schools. Some other studies ﬁnd no difference between private and public schools performances (see
Goldhaber (1996)).
15holds, segregation arises if (17) is satisﬁed, and partial segregation (1) arises if both (19) and
(17) are violated.
Corollary 2 (Inequality and segregation)
High income inequality leads to segregation, i.e., there is always a threshold for xB above
which segregation is the only equilibrium.
Figure 1 depicts the conditions under which each education regime arises. Two cases
can be distinguished depending on the value of γ.I fγ < ˆ γ,t h e nac o u n t r yw i t hl o w
inequality (low xB) will choose a public education regime. A country with high in-
equality will opt for segregation. In between there is a zone in which there is a public
sector in which all unskilled and some skilled participate. If γ > ˆ γ, the public regime
is never an equilibrium. Again, high inequality leads to segregation. Moreover, if the
share of skilled households in the population is low (low ξB), unskilled people are
indifferent between using public and private schools, so that the private sector serves
children from both groups.
4 Political Power and Multiple Equilibria
In this section, we relax the earlier assumption that both groups carry equal weight
in the voting process. We will see that if political power is concentrated among high-
income individuals, multiple equilibria can arise. We can normalize θB = 1w i t h o u t
loss of generality and vary θA to capture variations in the bias of the political system.
Taking the ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum of the objective function (11) and
solving for s yields:
s =
ηφ(1 + ξB)(θAψA + ψBξB)
(ψA + ψBξB)[θA + ξB + γη(θAψA + ξBψB)]
≡ sθ[ψA,ψB]. (20)
The corresponding tax rate is:
v =
ηγ(θAψA + ξBψB)
θA + ξB + γη(θAψA + ξBψB)
. (21)
16In the new formulation with variable voting power, Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 (ex-
istence of equilibrium) still go through. However, whether the equilibrium is unique
now depends on the weight θA of group A in the political system. If the political bias
favors the poor (θA ≥ 1), uniqueness is still guaranteed:
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness for θA ≥ 1 )
If the parameter θA satisﬁes
ξB(θA − 1)+θA(θA(1 + γη) − 1) > 0 (22)
there exists a unique equilibrium. θA ≥ 1 is sufﬁcient for (22) to hold.
For θA < 1, multiple equilibria may arise. It is also no longer true that the private
regime never exists (as we showed for θA = 1 in Corollary 1). Indeed, as Ψ goes to





θA + ξB .
The private regime exists if at this schooling level the unskilled prefer private over
public schooling. The condition for the existence of the private regime is:
∆A(0)=γ
 
−η ln(xA) − (1 − η)ln(1 − η)+η[ln(θA(1 + ξB))− ln(θA + ξB)]
 
< 0.




If the voting power of the unskilled is sufﬁciently low, the private regime exists. In-
tuitively, if the unskilled have little political inﬂuence, the quality of public schooling
is very low. Therefore private schooling becomes attractive to both types of agents.
To show that multiple equilibria can arise, we concentrate on the zone where public
schooling is the unique equilibrium when θA = 1. We establish that in this zone there
are at least three equilibria for a sufﬁciently strong bias to the rich (θA sufﬁciently
small).
17Proposition 6 (Multiplicity of equilibria for θA < 1 )
If θA, γ,a n dx B satisfy the conditions
θA <
xAξB
(δ − xA)+δξB, γ < ˆ γ, and xB < δ/(1 + γη),
there are at least three equilibria.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 6. Theprivate andpublicregimesare equilibria. There
is also a partial segregation regime with Ψ ∈ (1,2).
The possibility of multiple equilibria exists because we assumed that people have to
pre-commit to fertility and education choices before the vote takes place. If all deci-
sions were taken simultaneously, the voting process would lead to the same outcome
as the weighted social planning problem, which is unique. Pre-commitment gener-
ates multiplicity in this setting, but not int h ev e r s i o nw i t he q u al political weights,
because there is now a strategic complementarity between the education choices of
skilled people through the quality of public schools.7 When all skilled people use
private schools, an individual skilled person does not want to switch to the public
system since the quality of the public schooling is low. If, however, all skilled peo-
p l ew e r et os w i t c ht o g e t h e rt ot h ep u b l i csystem, they would vote for a much higher
quality of public schools; in that case it would be rational to stay in the public system.
Here, the political bias towards the rich offsets the congestion effect resulting from
higher participation to public schooling. Provided that there is a strong concentra-
tion of political power, the model can account for the fact that countries with similar
characteristics can choose different educational systems.
Our result can be compared to other voting modelswhere multiple equilibria arise. In
Saint-Paul and Verdier(1997)there is majority voting on acapital income tax. Ifpoliti-
cal power is unequally distributed, and is biased in favor of households having better
access to world capital markets, expectations-driven multiple equilibria are possible.
In a dynamic majority voting framework, Hassler, Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten, and
Zilibotti (2003) assume that young agents base their education decisions on expecta-
tions over future redistribution. Self-fulﬁlling expectations can lead to either high or
7When actions are strategic complements, the utility of those taking the action depends positively
on how many people take the action. Classic examples are Matsuyama (1991) for increasing returns,
Katz and Shapiro (1985) for network externalities, and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for bank runs.
18low redistribution equilibria. Finally, there are other political economy models that
do not have indeterminacy of equilibrium but display multiple steady states (see for
example B´ enabou 2000). Initial conditions, as opposed to self-fulﬁlling expectations,
determine which steady state the economy approaches.
The next proposition shows that despite the possibility of multiple equilibria, the
coverage of public schooling is never higher in societies dominated by the rich than
in democracies:
Proposition 7 (Coverage of public education as a function of θA )
Let ˆ Ψ be the equilibrium coverage of public education for ˆ θA ≥ 1,a n dˆ v the corresponding
tax rate. If ˜ Ψ and ˜ v are an equilibrium coverage and a tax rate for a ˜ θA ≤ ˆ θA,t h e nw eh a v e
˜ Ψ ≤ ˆ Ψ,
˜ v ≤ ˆ v.
In summary, if the political system is tilted towards the poor, the equilibrium is
unique and both the coverage of and spending on public education increase with
the political power of the poor. In contrast, if the rich wield more power than the
poor, multiple equilibria may arise. In any such equilibrium, the coverage of and
spending on public education cannot be higher than in the outcome with equal polit-
ical weights. If the inﬂuence of the poor is sufﬁciently low, entirely private education
systems are possible.
5 The Dynamics of Education Regimes
In the previous sections we have analyzed how the distribution of income and politi-
cal power shape education systems. We now consider how education feeds back into
income and population dynamics. Two dynamic links are key for this relationship.
First, a child’s probability of becoming skilled depends on its education. Second, the
weight of each group in the population is inﬂuenced by the fertility of both groups.
We will concentrate on dynamics in a democracy (where outcomes are unique), and
therefore assume θA = 1.






Adults now care about the probability πi
t that their children become skilled. This
probability depends on the education hi
t they receive. Speciﬁcally, given education h,
the probability of becoming skilled is given by:
πi
t = τi h
η
t .
Ifweplugthis function into(23)werecover the original form of the utility function (1)
up to a constant. We denote the complement probability 1−πi
t as ¯ πi
t.N o t et h a te q u a -
tion (8) can be used to deﬁne an upper bound on τi such that the probabilities belong





The parameter η now measures the elasticity of success with respect to the educa-
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in nature. An intertemporal equilibrium is therefore a sequence of time-t equilibria
held together by the laws of motion of the state variables. Existence and uniqueness
of time-t equilibria imply the same properties for intertemporal equilibria.
Deﬁnition 2 (Intertemporal equilibrium)
Given initial conditions (Pi
0)i=A,B, an intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence of time-t equi-
libria with {Pi
t}t≥0, i=A,B satisfying equations (24)-(25) at all dates t > 0.
Proposition 8 (Existence and uniqueness of intertemporal equilibria)
Given initial conditions {Pi
0}i=A,B, an intertemporal equilibrium exists and is unique.
20We now analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy. The evolution of the popu-
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Proposition 9 (Global dynamics)
The dynamics described by ξB
t+1 = Γ(ξB
t ) are bounded, and always admit a steady state in
R+.
The dynamics of ξB do not always converge to the steady state whose existence is
guaranteed bytheproposition. Since Γ(0) > 0andΓ(ξ) < ξ forlarge ξ,t h e r ei sa l w a y s
a steady state ¯ ξ for which Γ (¯ ξ) < 1. There are examples where the steady state is
locally stable (−1 < Γ (ξ) < 1), and other examples where Γ (ξ) < −1 and the steady
state is unstable. In the latter case, deterministic ever-lasting ﬂuctuations may occur.
Figure 3 provides such an example.8 The lower panel depicts the law of motion; it has
two increasing and one decreasing segments. The upper panel shows the education
regime that each ξB
t corresponds to. Thedecliningschedule inthe upperpaneldepicts
the mapping (5) from ξB
t into xB
t . We see that the declining part of the law of motions
corresponds to values for ξB
t which gives rise to the partial segregation regime. The
increasing segment of the law of motion above the 45 degrees line corresponds to
segregated education and the increasing segment below the 45 degrees line arises
under public education. The steady state (thick dot) lies in the decreasing segment
and is locally unstable. Instead there exists a limit cycle of period 2 (hollow dots) to
which dynamics converge. The economy reverts back and forth between the public
and the segregation regime, suggesting periodic swings in the balance between the
public and private provision of education.
Further insights on dynamics can be obtained within the public regime. We now
provide conditions under which a locally stable steady state exists in this regime. To
specialize to public education, we replace ψA
t and ψB
t in equation (26) by 1, and st by
8The parameters are: η = 0.4, φ = 0.075, γ = 0.2, wB = 3, τB = 1.7, and τA = 0.75.





¯ πA(s[1,1])+ ¯ πB(s[1,1])ξB
t
. (27)





Using equation (5), the corresponding level of xB is:
xB =
wB  
1 − (τB − τA)(s[1,1])
η 
1 − (τB − τAwB)(s[1,1])
η . (29)
We now provide a condition for a steady state inside the public regime and show that
it is always locally stable.









1 − τB (s[1,1])
η 
+ τA(1 + γη − δ)(s[1,1])
η,
the dynamics of the public regime admita steady state given by equations (28) and (29), which
is locally stable.
If the skill premium wB is too large, there is no steady state in the public regime. Oth-
erwise, if an economy starts in the public regime not too far away from the steady
state, it will converge to the steady state. Convergence is monotonous if τB > τA,
i.e. if children of skilled parents have a higher probability of becoming skilled than
children of unskilled parents for a given level of education. This stability result iscon-
sistent with the fact that countries having a public regime tend to stay in this regime
(see AppendixA.1). In the remaining education regimes, analytic solutions for steady
states and stability are not available. Private spending eA
t and eB
t and public spending
st will all depend on ξB
t , which makes equation (26) depend on higher powers of ξB
t .
226 Conclusions
The education of its citizens is one of main areas of government intervention in every
country in the world. At the same time, the government is generally not the only
provider of education; education systems often display a juxtaposition of public and
privately funded institutions. The degree of private involvement in the provision of
education varies a great deal over different countries, going from fully public sys-
tems as in some European countries to segregated systems as in parts of the U.S. In
this paper, we try to understand how countries choose the mix of public and private
education.
We ﬁrst conclude that high inequality maps into a segregated education system. In
a segregated system, the quality of public schools is sufﬁciently low for rich house-
holds to prefer paying for private schools to enhance the education of their children.
When inequality is low, on the other hand, the rich decide to send their children to
public schools, so that they avoid paying for education twice (ﬁrst through taxes,
second through private schools). The prediction of a strong relationship between in-
equality and the extent of public schooling is in line with empirical evidence. In both
cross-country data and cross-state data in the U.S., we ﬁnd that public spending on
education is negatively related to income inequality.
Turning to the role of political power, we ﬁnd that the quality and extent of public
schooling generally increases with the political weight of the poor. In addition, if
the poor are given at least equal weight in the political system, there is a unique
equilibrium outcome. In societies that are politically dominated by the rich, on the
other hand, multiple equilibria may arise. The reason is that when the rich are in
charge, there is a complementarity between the number of rich people participating
in public schools and their quality. For given initial conditions, such a country may
either have a high-quality public schooling system in which many or all of the rich
participate, or a low-quality system with all the rich using private schools. Despite
the multiplicity, however, we ﬁnd that spending on public education is never higher
in a society dominated by the rich than in an otherwise identical economy where
the poor have equal power. The model therefore provides an explanation for the
observation that non-democratic countries spend on average a smaller fraction of
GDP on public education than democracies, whereas the variance of spending across
23countries is higher.
While we have concentrated on cross-section evidence, another important question
for future research is why publiceducation was ﬁrst introduced in the nineteenth cen-
tury during the second phase of the Industrial Revolution. Galor and Moav (2001)
argue that in this period capitalists started to have an interest in public education,
because of complementarities between physical and human capital. Therefore, tech-
nological change strengthening this complementarity may have contributed to the
introduction of public schooling. Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2003) extend this anal-
ysis by distinguishing different sources of wealth. If land is less complementary to
human capital than physical capital, a conﬂict of interest arises between land-owners
and capitalists. The outcome of this conﬂict depends on the distribution of wealth
and land-ownership.
In our model, public schooling always arises if political power is equally shared. The
theory therefore points to the expansion of voting rights in the nineteenth century as
a key explanation for the introduction of public schooling. This still leaves open the
question why voting rights were expanded in the ﬁrst place. The theory of Galor and
Moav (2001) offers one potential explanation. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), how-
ever, point in a very different direction: the rich shared power in order to avoid the
threat of a revolution. In either case, given that the poor did gain political inﬂuence,
in our model the introduction of public schooling is a necessary consequence. Once
public education is in place, the size of the public system depends on the evolution
of the income distribution. To this end, the model points to the declining income in-
equality observed around the turn of the century as a potential explanation for the
large expansion of public education that followed its initial introduction.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 OECD Data on Private Funding
The OECD provides data on the relative proportions of publicand private investment
ineducation, distinguishing two levelsof education, primary/secondary and tertiary,
and covering the period 1985-1998. Apart from 1998, only OECD countries are cov-
ered. The number of countries varies from six in 1985 to 31 in 1998. In most countries,
private sector expenditure is comprised mainly of household expenditures on tuition
and other fees. The exception is Germany, where nearly all private expenditure is ac-
counted for by contributions from the business sector to the system of apprenticeship
at the upper secondary level. For primary and lower secondary education, there is
little private funding in Germany.
According to the OECD data, the scale of private-sector funding of education is in-
creasing over time. This general trend, however, hides a variety of different pat-
terns. Countries that have had predominantly public schooling for a long time tend
to stay in this regime. Among the eight countries that had a share of public spending
larger than 90 percent in the 1980s, seven are still in this situation 15 years later (Aus-
tria, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Italy). Only Canada left the
group. Among the countries with a lower share of public funding, a majority experi-
enced a decline in the share of publiceducation (Australia, Canada, Hungary, Ireland,
Japan, Korea, USA), while a smaller number expanded the public share (France, Ger-
many, Spain, Iceland, Mexico).
27In 1998, the data set contains information on a number of non-OECD countries (Nor-
way, Israel, Uruguay, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, Argentina, Indonesia,
Chile, Peru, Philippines, and Thailand). With observations on 31 countries, we can
investigate whether inequality is a good predictor of private funding. Computing
the correlation between Gini inequality coefﬁcient estimated in 1970 by Deininger
and Squire (1996) and private funding in 1998, we ﬁnd that the correlation is posi-
tive and relatively strong (0.44 or 0.45 if Germany is excluded from the sample), even
stronger when we consider only primary and secondary levels (0.55 or 0.59 if Ger-
many is excluded). Figure 4 presents the cross plot of the private share in primary
and secondary education with the Gini coefﬁcient.
An implication of our theory is that countries that use private resources in education
more intensively should be characterized by higher fertility differentials. As pointed
out by de la Croix and Doepke (2003), such endogenous fertility differentials amplify
the negative effect of inequality on growth. Table 1 provides average fertility differ-
entials for countries with high and low use of private resources in primary and sec-
ondary education. Differential fertility is deﬁned as the difference in fertility between
women from the highest education group and women from the lowest group (those
data from various surveys are summarized in Kremer and Chen 2002). The correla-
tion coefﬁcient between the two variables is 0.49, which is signiﬁcantly different from
zero at the 5 percent level with 15 observations.
Share of Private Funding Differential Fertility
High (> 15) 29.50 1.94
Low (≤ 15) 7.35 1.51
Table 1: Differential fertility and percentage share of private funding
A.2 Data on U.S. States
The National Center for Education Statistics provides direct general education ex-
penditures per capita of U.S. state and local governments for the years 1997 and 1998.
While we do not have estimates of private expenditures, we can investigate whether
income inequality is a good predictor of public spending on education. Computing
the correlation between the Gini inequality coefﬁcient estimated in 1979 (U.S. Census
Bureau) and the logarithm of public spending on education per capita in 1997-1998,
we ﬁnd that the correlation is negative and strong, -0.46. Figure 5 presents the corre-
sponding cross plot with the Gini coefﬁcient on the horizontal axis.
28A.3 Public Education Spending and Democracy
Although private spending on education is available for only few countries, more
data is available for the counterpart of private spending, namely public spending on
education (measured as a fraction of GDP). Here we have a sample of 158 countries.
We divide the country sample into 3 groups, based on their “level” of democracy. The
democracy index is computed as a 5 years average (1989/90-1994/95) of the political
right index from the Freedom in the World Country Ratings. This index lies on a one-
to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom. Public spending
on education as a share of GDP is from the World Bank Development Indicators and
are averaged over the period 1990-1995. Table 2 displays the mean and variance of
public spending over GDP for the three groups of countries. Variance is decreasing
with democracy, the mean follows a U shape. Table 3 displays two-tailed tests of
whether the differences put forward by Table 2 are signiﬁcant or not. The mean in
democratic countries is signiﬁcantly different from the one in the two other groups
(medium and low), and the variance in the low democracy group is signiﬁcantly
higher than in the two other groups.
Democracy Index Observations Mean Variance
High (= 1) 33 5.50 2.58
Medium (1 < x ≤ 4) 57 4.23 3.01
Low (4 < x ≤ 7) 68 4.56 4.95
Table 2: Public spending on education
Mean Difference Test Variance Ratio Test
Medium Low Medium Low
High 1.27 [0.01] 0.94 [0.02] 0.86 [ 0.65] 0.52 [0.05]
Medium -0.32 [0.36] 0.61 [0.06]
Table 3: Mean and variance tests
B Technical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: From budget constraint (2) total spending on children is given by
wiφni + niei ¯ w. Substituting either ni = ˆ n and ei = 0o rni = ˜ n and ei = ηφxi/(1 − η)
29yields that
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Proof of Lemma 2: We compute the level si such that group i is indifferent between
public and private by solving ui[v, ˆ n,0,si]=ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0]:
si =( 1 − η)
1
η−1ηφxi.
si is bigger than zero and depends positively on xi.I fs is greater than si, ui[v, ˆ n,0,si]
is greater than ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0],a n dt y p ei prefer public education. Since xB > xA,w e
have sB > sA, which proves the Lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Using the results of Lemma 2, ψB > 0 implies s ≥ sB > sA which
in turn implies ψA = 1. In the same way, ψA < 1 implies s ≤ sA < sB,w h i c hi nt u r n
implies ψB = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Since ∆A[Ψ] and ∆B[Ψ] are continuous functions, F(∆A[Ψ],
∆B[Ψ]) deﬁnes a continuous mapping from [0,2] to [0,2]. By Brouwer’s ﬁxed point
theorem, there is a ﬁxed point Ψ .T h eψA and ψB corresponding to this Ψ  satisfy
(14) and hence an equilibrium exists. 




With the quality of education going to ηφ, unskilled people prefer public education
because ∆A[0]=γ(−η ln(xA) − (1 − η)ln(1 − η)) > 0. Therefore the private regime
Ψ = 0 cannot be sustained. 
Proof of Proposition 2: We need to prove that ui[v, ˆ n,0,s] − ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0] is monotoni-
cally decreasing in ψA and ψB. Since the terms with v cancel out, and the terms with
n are constant, the only term that depends on ψA and ψB is s.I ti st h u ss u f ﬁ c i e n tt o
prove that s is monotonically decreasing in ψA and ψB. When varying ψA,w ek n o w
by Lemma 3 that ψB is equal to 0. When varying ψB, we know from Lemma 3 that ψA
is equal to 1. From equation (12) it appears immediately that
∂s[ψA,0]




Proof of Proposition 3: When Ψ = 2, the optimal schooling and taxation choice takes








In the segregation regime, all skilled people go to private schools and all unskilled
ones go to public school: Ψ = 1. The public schooling level is given by s = s[1,0],
which yields equation (16). The quality of public schooling is higher in the segrega-
tion regime than in the public regime because s[1,0] > s[1,1] for all ξB ∈]0,∞[.T h e
quality of public schooling decreases (increases) in the relative number of unskilled
(skilled) people in the population since ∂s[1,0]/∂ξB > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4: For the public regime to be an equilibrium, a skilled person
should weakly prefer public schooling to private schooling, given the tax rate and
schooling level that prevails in this regime. If this condition is satisﬁed for a skilled
parent, then by Lemma 3, the same follows for an unskilled parent. The constraint
takes the form:
uB [v, ˆ n,0,s] ≥ uB[v, ˜ n,eB,0].
After substituting v, ˆ n, s, ˜ n and eB by their equilibrium values, the condition leads
to (19). Thus, the relative income of skilled workers xB should be below a certain
threshold for them to stay in the public schools. Two cases can be distinguished. If
this threshold is larger than one, the public regime will emerge if xB lies between 1
and this threshold. If the threshold is lower than one (for example, if γ is large), then
the public regime cannot arise in equilibrium.
For the segregated regime to arise in equilibrium, two participation constraints have
to be met. First, the skilled persons should have no incentive to go to public schools,
and second, the unskilled persons should have no incentive to go to private schools.
The ﬁrst constraint can be written as:
uB [v, ˆ n,0,s] ≤ uB[v, ˜ n,eB,0].
After substituting v, ˆ n, s, ˜ n and eB by their equilibrium values, the constraint leads to
(17). Hence xB has to be sufﬁciently large for the skilled persons to stay in the private
schools. Intuitively, the gain from private schooling is a function of the income of the
parent, with the gain the greater the greater the income. The right hand side of (17)
tends to the one of equation (19) (public regime) as ξB goes to zero. It is increasing in
ξB and concave, and tends to δ > 1a sξB goes to inﬁnity. When γ > ˆ γ, the constraint
n e v e rb i n d sf o rs m a l lξB, but it can always be binding for large ξB since δ > 1. More
precisely, whenγ > ˆ γ, the right handsideof equation (17)starts belowtheline xB = 1
31for low ξB, crosses the line at the point:
ξB =
δ − (1 + γη)
1 − δ
, (30)
and then goes to δ.
The second constraint (unskilled parents do not choose private school) can be written
as:
uA [v, ˆ n,0,s] ≥ uA[v, ˜ n,eA,0].
After substituting v, ˆ n, s, ˜ n and eA by their equilibrium values, and replacing xA using
equation (6), the constraint leads to (18). Here again the threshold ˆ γ plays a central
role. If γ > ˆ γ, the right hand side of equation (18)starts from +∞ at ξB = 0, decreases,
crosses the axis xB = 1 at the point given in equation (30), and then converges to 1
from below as ξB goes to +∞. Since the right hand sides of equations (17) and (18)
cross the axis xB = 1 at the same point, the two conditions cannot be violated at the
same time. For γ < ˆ γ, the constraints (18) never binds.
In the two partial segregation regimes, either the skilled or the unskilled parents are
indifferent between public and private schooling. We ﬁrst consider the case where
the skilled are indifferent:
uB [v, ˆ n,0,s]=uB[v, ˜ n,eB,0].
The equilibrium values for ψB, s,a n dv are obtained by solving a system of three











(1 + ξB)(δ/xB − 1) − γη
γηξB . (31)
For partial segregation to occur in equilibrium, the only condition is that the value
for ψB in (31) is between zero and one. It is also necessary that unskilled parents
strictly prefer public schooling, but since the skilled are indifferent this condition is
automatically satisﬁed because of Lemma 3. We therefore only need to check that ψB
is between 0 and 1. Using equation (31), the constraint 0 < ψB < 1h o l d si f :
δ(1 + ξB)





32This inequality is satisﬁed when the participation constraints (19) and (17) are simul-
taneously violated.
Inthe second typeofpartial segregation, itistheunskilled parentswhoareindifferent
between the two types of schools:
uA [v, ˆ n,0,s]=uA[v, ˜ n,eA,0].
Asabove, the equilibrium valuesψA, s and v are obtained by solving a system of three











(1 + ξB)(xA − 1/δ)
γη
. (32)
We only need to verify that ψA is below 1 (it is above 0 by Corollary 1), since by
Lemma 3 the skilled always prefer private schooling when the unskilled are indiffer-







1 + ξB + γη
 
This inequality is satisﬁed when the participation constraint (18) is violated. 
Proof of Proposition 5: It is sufﬁcient to prove that ui[v, ˆ n,0,s] − ui[v, ˜ n,ei,0] are
monotonically decreasing in ψA and ψB for θA ≥ 1, which amounts as in Proposi-
tion 2 to proving that s is monotonically decreasing in ψA and ψB. When varying ψA,




(θA + ξB + θAψAγη)2
is always negative. When varying ψB, we know by Lemma 3 that ψA is equal to 1:
∂s[1,ψB]
∂ψB =
−ηφξB(1 + ξB)[ξBψBγη(ξBψB + 2θA)+ξB(θA − 1)+θA(θA(1 + γη) − 1)]
(1 + ξBψB)2(ξB + θA + γη(θA + ξBψB))2 .
The numerator is decreasing in ψB: if the numerator is negative for ψB = 0, then it is
33negative for all ψB. The numerator when ψB = 0i se q u a lt o :
−ηφξB(1 + ξB)[ξB(θA − 1)+θA(θA(1 + γη) − 1)].
This expression is negative when condition (22) holds. In particular, it is negative
for any ξB ≥ 0f o rθA ≥ 1. When θA is smaller than one, uniqueness of equilibrium
depends on ξB. When the population weight of skilled people decreases, the condi-
tion on θA becomes less restrictive; at the limit, when ξB → 0, the threshold tends to
1/(1 + γη). 
Proof of Proposition 6: We start by observing that the level of public schooling in the
public regime is independent of θA:
sθ[1,1]=s[1,1].
This implies that the public regime exists for all θA < 1i fi ta l s oe x i s t sf o rθA = 1.
Hence, in the case γ < ˆ γ, the public regime is an equilibrium for xB < δ/(1 + γη)
and for all θA ≤ 1. We have shown above that if θA is below the threshold stated in
the proposition, private education is an equilibrium as well. Hence, there are at least
two equilibria. Finally, to establish that there are at least three equilibria we can use
the continuity of the functions ∆A and ∆B with respect to Ψ to prove the existence of
a third equilibrium. For a given θA below the threshold, we have ∆A and ∆B smaller
than 0 at Ψ = 0 and bigger than 0 at Ψ = 2. It follows from continuity and Lemma 3
that there is either a Ψ between 0 and one where ∆A = 0a n d∆B < 0, or a Ψ between
1a n d2w i t h∆A > 0a n d∆B = 0. Thus there is a third equilibrium with partial
segregation. 
Proof of Proposition 7: At given ψA and ψB, the quality of public education increases
with θA; taking the derivatives of s given in (20) yields:
∂sθ[ψA,ψB]
∂θA =
(ψA − ψB)ηφξB(1 + ξB)
(ψA + ψBξB)
 
θA + ξB + ηγ(ψAθA + ψBθB)
 2 > 0.
It implies that the ∆i[Ψ]’s (utility difference between public and private education)
are increasing with θA. Therefore, the mapping F(∆A,∆B) deﬁned in the proof of
Proposition 1 is weakly increasing in θA. Since equilibria are ﬁxed points of F,t h e






θA + ξB + ηγ(ψAθA + ψBθB)









θA + ξB + γη(θA + ψBξB)
 2 > 0.
Hence the total effect of increasing θ on v is non-negative. In fact, it is strictly positive
except at Ψ = 2. 
Proof of Proposition 8: Since there is at each date t an equilibrium of period t that
does not depend on the future, and since the dynamics (24) are deﬁned in R2
+,t h ee x -
istence and uniqueness of time-t equilibria implies the same properties for intertem-
poral equilibria. 
Proof of Proposition 9: We compute the limits of the function Γ deﬁned in equation
(26) when ξB
t goes to zero and to inﬁnity; both Γ(0) and limξ→∞ Γ(ξ) are strictly posi-
tive and ﬁnite. Since Γ is a continuous function on R+ and converges to ﬁnite values
on the border of its deﬁnition set, it is bounded from above. Hence, dynamics of ξB
t
are bounded. Since Γ(0) > 0a n dΓ(ξ) < ξ for large ξ,t h e r ei sal e a s to n e¯ ξ such that
Γ(¯ ξ)=¯ ξ and ¯ ξ is a steady state. 
Proof of Proposition 10: The upper bound on wB is deﬁned by the participation
constraint (19). Linearizing (27) around the steady state, we ﬁnd that the condition
|(τB − τA)s[1,1]η| < 1
is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for local stability. Since τBs[1,1]η < 1a n d

















Ψ = 1 Ψ = 1
Ψ ∈ (1,2)


















 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

















































































































Figure 5: Inequality and education across U.S. states
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